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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RULE IN
PINNEL'S CASE
JOSEPH GoLD*
(Continued from November issue.)

EXCEPTIoNs To THE Runz iN PNNE,'S CASE
There are a number of cases in which the payment or
promise of payment of a less sum may discharge a larger indebtedness although no element of consideration for the discharge can be found.
Compositions with creditors
A composition is an arrangement between two or more
creditors with the debtor to accept part of their debts in satisfaction of the whole. It is essential that there be some conjoint
action. Where a single creditor agreed with the debtor to accept a percentage of his debt, provided no other creditor received more, this was not a composition. 158 There is no composition even if the debtor approaches several creditors and makes
terms with each, if each acts on his own judgment and gets what
he can. 157 But in order to constitute a composition it is not
necessary that all of the creditors, or even a majority of them,
must act in concert. 158 It is sufficient if but two of them join in
the agreement.
Compositions have a long history. They were arranged
and enforced by the King's Council for the benefit of deserving
creditors as early as the sixteenth century.15 9 Later, the supervision of compositions was taken over by Equity. The earliest
case cited by Montagu in his monograph and collection of cases
published in 1823 is Child v. Danbridge decided in 1688.160 In
most of the early equity cases the jurisdiction of the court was
invoked to set aside a secret arrangement between one creditor
1.

* LL.B., 1935, LL.M., 1936, University of London. University of
London Research Scholar, 1936; Assistant Lecturer in Law, Uni-

versity College, University of London, 1937-1939; Research Fellow,
Harvard Law School, 1939-1941.
W

Perkins v. Lockwood (1868) 100 Mass. 249.
Greenwood v. Lidbetter (1823) 12 Price 183; Hayes v. David-

son (1874) 70 N.C. 573; Segal v. Heuer (1901) 33 Misc. 601, 67 N.Y.S.
929; Sondhelm v. Scalers (1916) 161 N.Y.S. 291.
'Norman v. Thompson (1850) 4 Ex. 755; Boyd v. Hind (1857)
1 H. & N. 938.
1"Holdsworth, History of English Law, viii, 233-234.
"'2 Vern. 71.
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and the debtor by which that creditor was given an advantage
not enjoyed by the other creditors. 161 These cases imply that
the composition was binding, otherwise it would not have been
fraudulent to take the secret advantage. There is some evidence that equity would also enforce a composition, provided
the debtor tendered an exact performance. 162 In these early
cases there was no discussion of the consideration received by
the creditors for the abatement of part of their debts. Moreover,
it is fairly clear from some of the cases that there was no consideration such as existed in the early cases at law. In other
163
words, there was no consideration at all.
Cases at law involving compositions became common at the
end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In those compositions recognized as binding there was
usually one of two features, which were taken by the court to
provide consideration for the creditors' promises. Either the
debtor assigned all his property for the benefit of the creditors, 1 64 or he procured negotiable instruments from a stranger
for the purpose of paying or securing the dividends agreed upon
in the composition. 165 When the question arose whether a composition unsupported by such consideration was binding, courts
of law at first answered that they were not. In Heathcote v.
Crookshanks (1787),166 there was a composition in which the
debtor promised nothing but a part payment of his debts, in
return for the creditors' promise of a full discharge. In this
action by a creditor for his original debt, the debtor pleaded
that he had tendered performance according to the composition,
but the King's Bench held this no defense. The Court treated
the case as simply involving a promise to pay part of a debt,
which could not be consideration for a discharge of the whole
debt. In Fitch v. Sutton (1804),167 Lord Ellenborough delivered
1'Small v. Brackley (1707) 2 Vern. 602; Middleton v. Onslow
(1721) 1 P. Wins. 763; Spurret v. Spiller (1740) 1 Atk. 105.

1Castleton v. Fanshaw (1699) Pres. in Ch. 99; Perrot v. Wells

(1690) 2 Vern. 127; Ex parte Bennet (1743) 2 Atk. 526.
Child v. Danbridge (1688) 2 Vern. 71; Ex parte Smith (1789)

3 Bro. C.C. 1.
Cockshott v. Bennett (1788) 2 T.R. 763; Jackson v. Lomas
(1791) 4 T.R. 166; Bigelow v. Bigelow (1854) 1 Gray 245.
-OSteinman v. Magnus (1809) 11 East 390; Bradley v. Gregory
(1810) 2 Camp. 383.
'-2 T.R. 24.
5 East 230.
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a similar opinion, although in the interim there had been a case
at nisi prius decided otherwise.1 68 Good v. (heesman (1831) ' 9
established the modern doetrine1o A composition consisting of
nothing but a promise to pay the dividend and promises to accept
it was binding, it was held, because on this new agreement on
action will lie.
There has been much discussion of the nature of the consideration provided by a debtor who is a party to a composition
under which he merely promises to pay part of his debts. At
least four views have been advanced.
(a) Consideration moves from the debtor in that he procures
the promises of the creditors. This may be true, but it is not
necessary that the debtor should take the initiative, and quite
often he does not.171 The composition will be binding even
where the creditors first agree among themselves, and then put
the proposition before the debtor.
(b) Consideration is provided by the creditors in their
proportionate abatement of their debts. 17 2 There are two objections to this view. The abatement need not be proportionate.
If all the creditors who join in the composition agree that one
of their number shall have a larger proportion, or some advantage not enjoyed by the rest, that arrangement will be binding.173 Furthermore, the creditors may agree to forego the
whole of their debts, even though they are of varying sums.7 4
The second objection is that even if the view is accepted
that the promises of the creditors to remit part of their debts
are consideration for each other, 75 it is not possible to find any
consideration in this moving from the debtor. It is quite reasonable to hold that as among the creditors there is consideration,
Jolly v. Wallis (1801) 3 Esp. 228. See also Cooling v. Noyes
(1795) 6 T.R. 263.
102 B. & Ad. 328.

2" But see Societe Generale de Paris v. Geen (1883) 8 App. Cas.

606, 614-615.
'Eaton

v. Lincoln (1816)

13 Mass. 424.

'Leicester v. Rose (1803) 4 East 372; Farmers' Bank of Dardanelle v. Sellers (1925) 167 Ark. 152, 157, 267 S.W. 591.

I"Ex parte Sadler (1808) 15 Ves. 52; Pfleger v. Browne (1860)
28 Beav. 391; Montagu on Compositions with Creditors (1823) 24,
Forsyth on Compositions (1841), 99.
"'"West Yorkshire Darracq Agency v. Coleridge (1911) 2 K.B.
326.
"' Pierson v. McCahill (1862) 21 Cal. 122; Laird v. Campbell
(1880) 92 Pa. 470; Gilfilian v. Farrington (1882) 12 Ill. App. 101;
White v. Kuntz (1887) 107 N.Y. 518, 14 N.E. 423. Forsyth, 4.
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since by the composition each is to get something, whereas many
of them might get nothing if the debtor were allowed to pick
and choose among them.178 It can hardly be asserted that the
debtor's surrender of this power is a detriment to him.
(c) It is sometimes said that the creditors' promises are
made for the benefit of the'debtor, so as to enable him to sue on
This explanation will obviously not apply to English
them.1 71
law, which has not yet reached the point where strangers to the
consideration can sue upon the contract.
(d) Holdsworth'17 8 has said that a composition really consists of two agreements--one by the creditors inter se to accept
part of their debts, and the other by the debtor to assign his
property for the benefit of his creditors. There is nothing in
this suggestion, since there is no need for the debtor to do anything but promise to pay the dividends.
The search for a consideration provided by the debtor in a
composition agreement is a useless task. There are frequent
references in the cases to a principle that creditors may not sue
for their original debts after entering into a composition,
because actions of this kind would be frauds on the other creditors.1 7 9 This is implied recognition of the fact that there is
really no consideration moving from the debtor, and some courts
have openly confessed that compositions really constitute an
80
exception to the rule in Pinnet's Case.'
2 Negotiable instruments
By the law merchant it was possible for the holder of a bill
of exchange or promissory note to renounce his rights. He could
do so on the receipt of part of the indebtedness, or even without
receiving anything.' 8 ' This is still the law, except that certain
requirements of form must now be observed.
I Williams v. Carrington (1857) 1 Hilt. 516; Pierce, Butler & Co.
v. Jones & Son (1876) 8 S.C. 273.

-Sadler v. Jackson (1808) 15 Ves. 52, 55; Continental National
Bank of Chicago v. McGeoch (1896) 92 Wis. 286, 310, 66 N.W. 606;
Stewart Bros. v. Langston (1898) 103 Ga. 290, 30 S.E. 35.
I" Hist. Eng. Law, viii, 85, n. 2.
2"Greenwood v. Lidbetter (1823) 12 Price 183; Couldery v.
Bartrum (1881) 19 ChD. 394, 400; Stewart Bros. v. Langston (1898)
103 Ga. 290, 30 S.E. 35.
2'Pfleger v. Browne (1860) 28 Beav. 391; Peoples Exchange

Bank of Elmdale v. Miller (1934) 139 Kan. 3, 29 P.(2d) 1079.
""Foster v. Dawber (1851) 6 Ex. 839.
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See. 62 of the Bills of Exchange Act provides:
"(1)

When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity absolutely

and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor the
I
bill is discharged.
The renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered

up to the acceptor.
(2)

The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be

renounced by the holder before, at, or after its maturity; but
nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a holder in due course
without notice of the renunciation."
There is a similar provision in the American Negotiable Instruments Law:
"The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party

to the instrument before, at, or after its maturity. An absolute and
unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor

made at or after the maturity of the instrument, discharges the
instrument, but a renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder

in due course without notice. A renunciation must be in writing
unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable
thereon.'
It has been decided that the renunciation itself must be in
writing. A mere memorandum or note of the renunciation or of
an intention to renounce is not sufficient.1 8 3

In one respect the stautory provisions seem to be less favorable to the discharge of liability than the common law. At common law, rescission of an executory contract may be by parol.
If this were applied to bills and notes, it would follow that liability on them might be renounced by parol before maturity.
The above sections, however, require writing even in this case.' 8 4
It has been decided that accord and satisfaction by something
other than money is not excluded or governed by these sections,
so that writing would not be necessary.'8 5
It should also be noted that negotiable instruments may be
purchased for less than their face value. This, it has been held,
does not violate the rule in Pinnel's Oase. "They might as
'Pearson and Fant v. Thomason (1849) 15 Ala. 700; Kent v.
Reynolds (1876) 8 Hun 559; Babcock v. Bonnell (1878) 44 N.Y.
Super. 568; Jones v. Wettlin (1928) 39 Wyo. 339, 271 Pac. 217;
Abraham v. Mike (1936) 178 Okl. 597, 63 P. (2d) 743, (1937)
179 Old. 224, 65 P. (2d) 183. But see Bragg v. Danielson (1886)
141 Mass. 195, 4 N.E. 622.
'Re George (1890) 44 Ch. D. 627.
"Re George (1890) 44 Ch. D. 627; Edwards v. Walters (1896)
2 Ch. 157.
2'Jones v. Wettlin (1928) 39 Wyo. 339, 271 Pac. 217.
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properly be the subject of such a contract as any other species
"186
of personal property..
3.

Interest
In both England and the United States, where the debtor
pays the principal sum of his debt, whether in full satisfaction
or not, the creditor may later bring an action to recover interest,
if he is entitled to interest by the express' 8 7 or implied 88 agreement of the parties, or by statute.' 8 9
Where interest is claimed as damages for the detention of
the debt, the payment of the principal will amount to a satisfaction of the claim for interest. It follows that the payments of a
less sum has the effect in these cases of discharging a larger
debt. The reason appears to be that the claim for interest is no
more than a claim for nominal damages, and almost in the
nature of a vexatious proceeding.
"Nominal damages are a mere peg on which to hang costs. If a
creditor were to say to his debtor, 'You owe me £50 and a nominal
sum for the detention thereof,' and the latter were to produce £50
and tender it to the former, saying, 'Here is the amount of the debt I

owe you, and the nominal damages you claim,' that, I conceive,
would be a very good tender. Nominal damages, in fact, mean a
sum of money that may be spoken of, but that has no existence in
point of quantity; and I think a man may very well pay £50 in
satisfaction and discharge of 'a debt of £50 and of the nominal
damages due for its detention."

The same idea has been expressed by Lord Atkin: "Nominal
damages in respect of the non-payment of a debt are a fond
thing vainly invented."191
Rockwell v. Taylor (1874) 41 Conn. 55.
1"Fake v. Eddy's Ex'r. (1835) 15 Wend. 307; Hart v. Freeman
(1868) 42 Ala. 467; Zeccolillo v. Weinberg (1934) 151 Misc. 653, 273
N.Y.S. 592.
'Re W. W. Duncan & Co. (1905) 1 Ch. 307; Bullen & Leake's
Precedents in Pleading (9th ed., 1935), 210.
'Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605; Devlin v. Mayor, 131
N.Y. 123; Smith v. Buffalo, 39 N.Y.S. 881.
Beaumont v. Greathead (1846) 2 C.B. 494, 499-500, per Maule
J. See also: Price v. Brown (1726) 2 Stra. 691; Dixon v. Parkes
(1794) 1 Esp. 110; Tillotson v. Preston (1808) 3 Johns. 229; Johnston
v. Brannan (1810) 5 Johns. 268; Stevens v. Barringer (1835) 13
Wend. 639; Thame v. Boast (1848) 12 Q.B. 808; Wescott v. Waller
(1872) 47 Ala. 492; Roberts v. Brandies (1887) 44 Hun 468; Bennett
v. Federal Coal and Coke Co. (1912) 70 W.Va. 456, 74 S.E. 418;
Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings (1922)
1 K.B. 451.
'Societe etc. v. Cummings (1922) 1 K.B. 451, 464.

RULE OF PINNEL'S CASE
EVASION AND ABROGATION OF THE R DE IN PINNEL'S CASE

As a consequence of the almost universal dislike of the rule
in Pinne's Case, there have been attempts to evade its effect by
the application of other doctrines. There has also been a strong
tendency to abrogate it by direct legislative or judicial action.
EvAsIoN

Executed agreements
There is much American authority to the effect that an
agreement, which would be unsupported by consideration if
executory, becomes binding if it is executed. If a debtor owes
$50, and he agrees with his creditor to pay $10 in full satisfaction, and then pays, the creditor cannot recover the balance according to the doctrine of these cases. Vigelius v. Vigetius192 is a
recent example of this type of case. By a separation agreement the defendant agreed to pay his wife $75 a month. That
agreement was later modified by another under which he was
to pay only $25 a month. This action was brought by the wife
on the first agreement to recover the difference between the
two sums during the period in which the second agreement had
been performed. The wife argued that as the first agreement
was not executory on her part, the second agreement was without consideration. The Court refused to disturb the second contract insofar as it had been performed, precisely because it had
been performed. 193 Many of the cases involve agreements reducing rent under leases.'0 4 Sympathy for the lessee's economic
plight may partly explain the Court's refusal to allow recovery
of the deductions. In a New Jersey case in which the Court
rejected this line of authority, it was noted that it was a modern
tendency in some jurisdictions to give effect to "reasonable"
modifications of leases, though unsupported by consideration.
(a)

"General economic adversity, however disastrous it may be in its
(1932) 169 Wash. 190, 13 P. (2d) 425.
See also: Maxwell v. Graves (1882) 59 Iowa 613, 13 N.W. 758;
Lamb v. Morrow (1908) 140 Iowa 89, 117 N.W.; Davis v. Culmer
(1927) 221 Mo. App. 1037, 295 S.W. 803; Leidy v. Procter (1929)
226 App. Div. 322, 235 N.Y.S. 101; State v. American Surety Co.
(1931) 137 Ore. 394, 300 Pac. 511, 2 P. (2d) 1116. See dicta by Buller
and Ashurst, JJ., in Heathcote v. Crookshanks (1787) 2 T.B. 24,

cited in State Bank at Elizabeth v. Chetwood (1824) 8 N.J.L. 1,
26.
" Robertson v. Campbell (1800) 2 Call. (Va.) 421; Doyle v.
Dunn (1908) 140 Ill. App. 14; Julian v. Gold (1931) 3 P.(2d) 1009.
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individual consequences, is never a warrant for judicial abrogation
of this primary principle of the law of contracts.""M

These cases cannot be supported. The execution of the modifled agreement adds nothing to the case. Consideration is necessary in the dissolution of obligations as well as in the creation. 196 Pinnel's Case speaks not of executory promises to pay
a less sum in satisfaction of a larger, but of the actual payment
of the smaller sum in satisfaction.
The reduction of rent cases have also been supported on the
ground that by the reduction of rent the lessor retains a tenant
who otherwise might be unable to perform at all under the
original lease. 197 However true this may be, it does not amount
to a consideration for the lessor's promise to reduce the rent, or
for acceptance of less rent in satisfaction of the rent originally
reserved. There is no detriment to the lessee, and the advantage to the lessor must be something collateral to or other than
the benefit he derives from the prompt payment of part of the
rent.
In some of the cases holding the executed agreement cannot
be disturbed, it is admitted that there is no consideration. 198
In Idaho, it has been held, citing Frye v. Hubbell,199 that an
executed agreement under which a part payment is to be accepted in satisfaction of a debt is a "well-recognized" exception
to the rule in Pinnel's Case, if the agreement is evidenced by a
written receipt.20 0 The reason given is "that after a contract
has been fully executed on both sides the question of consideration becomes immaterial."
In Frye v. Hubbell, however, no
exception to the rule in Pinnle's Case was recognized. The rule
itself was repudiated. Moreover, there is nothing in that case
calling for written evidence, although that is obviously desirable

in view of the nature of the transaction.
In some cases it is said that consideration originally lacking
'Levine v. Blumenthal (1936) 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 At. 457, 459.
'Pusheck v. Willard Assn. (1900) 94 Il. App. 192; Amsler v.
McClure (1913) 238 Pa. 409, 86 At. 294; Moore v. Muskegon Trust
(1938) 286 Mich. 21, 281 N.W. 423.
'Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co. (1921) 117 Wash. 378, 201

Pac. 26.

'Julian v. Gold (1931) 3 P.(2d) 1009; State v. American
Surety Co. (1931) 137 Ore. 394, 300 Pac. 511, 2 P.(2d) 1116.
(1907) 74 N.H. 358, 68 Atl. 325.
'Marysville Development Co. v. Hargis (1925) 41 Idaho 257,
239 Pac. 522.
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is supplied by execution. 20 1 There appear to be two general
ideas behind this statement. At one time some courts experienced difficulty in seeing how a contract could be concluded
where there had been the offer of a unilateral contract followed
by the performance called for.20 2 They found it difficult to
understand how a single act could at once be an acceptance, consideration and performance. They were even more troubled by
the legal character of the offer of a unilateral contract before
the other party's performance. Hence it was often said that
mutuality originally lacking may be supplied by performance.
This statement is almost a clichg in some jurisdictions, and it is
employed with the absence of thought which is the main usefulness of a cliche. While it is true that rendering the performance called for by the offer of a unilateral contract "supplies
mutuality" in the sense that a contract is concluded where none
existed before, there is no true analogy between that case and
the execution of a concluded agreement consisting of mutual
promises. The performance of an agreement of this kind does
not import a consideration. If before performance there was
no consideration, there will be no consideration after performance.
The other idea implicit in the cases is the exploded theory
that a party to a contract has the right to refuse performance
and pay damages for his breach. If he surrenders his "right"
to break the old contract, and instead performs a new agreement,
which happens to be more advantageous to him, he has in this
way suffered a detriment. If attention is directed to his "duty"
to pay damages, then the performance of the new agreement is a
performance he was not bound to render, so that there is again
a detriment to him or a benefit to the other. These arguments
depend on an obvious fallacy.
(b) Gifts
There are a few cases in which it has been held that where a
creditor accepts part of a debt in full satisfaction, there is an
implied gift of the balance to the debtor. It is said in them that
a gift of tangible property inter vivos is constituted by delivery
with an intention to transfer title. Delivery is not possible in
the case of a debt, and as "the character of the gift dictates the
Bufton v. Crane, 101 Vt. 276, 280.
" Page, Contracts (2d ed., 1920) sec. 582.

K. L. J.-5
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manner of its delivery," the gift is completed by some such
20 3
method as a receipt in full.
These cases have not made as much headway as those considered above, 20 4 but the principle formulated by them must be
examined more fully, if only because it has earned the approval
20 5
of a learned author.
It is said that a distinction must be drawn between an acceptance of part of a debt in full satisfaction, and the acceptance
of part as a satisfaction pro tanto with an intention to discharge
the rest. In the former case there will be no satisfaction of the
whole debt; but in the latter the intention to remit the balance
can take effect as a gift or assignment to the debtor, for which
consideration is not necessary. The major premise is a shaky
one. It is highly artificial to distinguish between the two transactions. In almost every case in which the creditor expressly
accepts part of a debt in full satisfaction, he intends to abate the
balance. But even if the first stage in the argument is accepted,
the rest by no means follows. To call the attempted abatement
of the balance an assignment to the debtor is a very unusualone might take a plunge and say unprecedented-use of language. If, in the unlikely event that the courts would be willing
to consider it possible to assign a debt to the debtor from whom
it is due, it would still not be true that a method had been found
for the complete evasion of Pinnel's Case. In such jurisdictions
as England, some formality, such as writing, is required for a
legal assignment. If the formality is employed, consideration is
not necessary. If, however, the formality is not employed, but
the debtor asserts that the assignment takes effect in equity, the
Court is faced with the problem whether consideration is necessary to support an equitable assignment. That problem has
never been satisfactorily and completely settled, but it would
'Gray v. Barton (1873) 55 N.Y. 68; Green v. Langdon (1873)
28 Mich. 221; Carpenter v. Soule (1882) 88 N.Y. 251; Lamprey v.
Lamprey (1882) 29 Minn. 151; Maslin's Ex'rs. v. Hiett (1892)
39 W. Va. 15, 16 S.E. 437; Rye v. Phillips (1938) 203 Minn. 567, 282
N.W. 459.
"4 They were not followed in: Ryan v. Ward (1872) 48 N.Y. 204;
Ahrens v. United Growers' Co. (1895) 11 Misc. 108, 31 N.Y.S. 997;
Jones v. Rice (1897) 19 Misc. 357, 43 N.Y.S. 491; Evers v. Ostheimer
(1902) 37 Misc. 163, 74 N.Y.S. 872; Rosenbaum v. National Ass. Soc.
(1917) 167 N.Y.S. 49; Hamburg v. Cundill (1927) 219 App. Div. 506,
517, 220 N.Y.S. 270.
'Ferson, The Rule in Foakes v. Beer (1921) 31 Yale L.J. 15.
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seem that if the assignment is not completed, equity will not
assist a volunteer. Completion of the assignment depends on
the character of the property assigned. In the case of a simple
debt, a deed would be necessary.
When it is said that there may be an assignment of a debt
to the debtor himself, what is really meant in accepted legal
terminology is that there is a gift to him of the money he owes
or a release. There could be no release at common law except
under seal, except where a debt was evidenced by an instrument
which was cancelled, and there could be no forgiveness of a debt
without employing a deed. Equity would not depart from this
common law rule in order to assist a volunteer. 20 6 The only
possible exception to this was where a debtor was induced to
follow a course of conduct to his detriment on the representation that he would be given a release. The creditor would then
7
be compelled to make the representation good. 20
Except for this last case, it is clear that a parol forgiveness
of a debt was ineffective at law and in equity. Although the
seal retains much of its former sanctity in England, American
jurisdictions have not felt compelled to share this reverence.
More than half of the states have adopted some measure modifying its common law effect. It remains to be seen how far these
modifications make it possible for the Courts to recognize the
parol forgiveness of debts. This study may be prefaced with
one remark. Although the rule in Pinnel's Case is everywhere
treated with distaste, the courts of the jurisdictions in which
these statutory changes have been adopted have been strangely
reluctant to employ them to destroy the effect of the rule.
The statutory provisions take various forms:
(1) In Nebraska and Texas it is merely provided that the
use of private seals is abolished. Courts have held this to mean
that the consideration of all contracts may be inquired into, and
further, that the payment of a less sum in satisfaction of a debt
208
is not an effective discharge of the whole debt.
: Cross v. Spring (1849) 3 Hare 552; Peace v. Hains (1853) 11
Hare 151; Edwards v. Walters (1896) 2 Ch. 157; Goodeve's Modern
Law of Personal Property (1937) 239. There were dicta to the

contrary by Lord Loughborough in Flower v. Marten (1937) 2 My.

& Cr. 459.
184.

'Yeomans v. Williams (1865) 35 Beav. 130, (1865) L.R. 1 Eq.
" Richardson v. Woodruff (1886) 20 Neb. 132, 137, 29 N.W. 308;
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(2) In Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, California,
Oklahoma and Arkansas it is provided that there shall be no
difference between sealed and unsealed instruments. There is
nothing in this statement which necessarily leads to the conclusion that a parol abatement of a debt would be binding.
Prima facie, it would seem to mean, not that consideration is
dispensed with where formerly it was necessary, but that consideration is necessary where formerly it could be dispensed
with. On this interpretation the release or gift of a debt by
deed would no longer be possible. An Arkansas court has not
adopted this conclusion. It held that a direct result of the
abolition of the difference between sealed and unsealed instruments was to validate an unsealed written release. It preferred
to decide on this ground, although, as it pointed out, it would
have found that the case it was considering came within one of
the recognized exceptions to Pinnel's Case. 20 9 On the other
hand, a California Court decided that the effect of the statute
was not to abrogate the necessity for consideration, but to make
all contracts, sealed or unsealed, open to the objection of a want
of consideration. It held that an incomplete voluntary gift was
not binding. The only difference between this and the Arkansas case was that in the latter there was written evidence of the
2 10
release.
(3) In Kentucky, there is a slightly different provision. It is
enacted, not that there shall be no difference between sealed and
unsealed instruments, but that they shall have the same effect.
It seems unlikely that any difference in legal consequences will
follow from this slight difference in terminology. It has been
held that a release in writing given on the payment of part of a
211
debt is not binding.
(4) Yet a third version, and again incorporating but a
slight variation of language, are the statutes of Missouri, Iowa,
Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio, Kansas, Washington and Tennessee. These provide that the use of a seal shall not affect the
force or validity of an instrument. This seems a fairly.clear
Luce v. Foster (1894) 42 Neb. 818, 832, 60 N.W. 1027; Silvers Box
Corp. v. Boynton Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App., 1927) 297 S.W. 1059.
'Dreyfus v. Roberts (1905) 75 Ark. 354, 87 S. W. 641. See also
Gordon v. Moore (1884) 44 Ark. 349.
Tracy v. Alvord (1897) 118 Cal. 654, 50 Pac. 757.
m
D eCourcey's Adm'r. v. Dickens (1880) 10 Ky. Op. 660; Younce
v. Duty (1924) 205 Ky. 274, 265 S.W. 776.
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indication that voluntary releases are not to be binding. In
some of the statutes it is further said that every contract in
writing imports a consideration. This provision has been interpreted to be no more than a rule relating to the burden of
proof. The absence of consideration may in all cases be
proved, 212 including those in which a receipt in full is given on
the payment of part ot a debt. 213 It has been suggested by a
Washington Court that the statutory abolition of the difference
between sealed and unsealed instruments has abolished the rule in
Pinnel's Case.2 14 This view has not been adopted in later
Washington cases. 215
(5) The statutes of Indiana, Oregon and Wyoming say
that sealed and unsealed instruments shall have the same force
and effect, but go on to provide that "every writing not sealed
shall have the same force and effect that it would have if
sealed. . . An agreement in writing without a seal for the
compromise or settlement of a debt is as obligatory as if a seal
were affixed." Whereas the Kentucky statute says the two instruments shall have the same force and effect, but does not
select one as the criterion for the other, these statutes choose
the sealed instrument as the criterion. It seems reasonably clear
that an unsealed release must take effect under this provision,
and this interpretation is considerably strengthened by the express mention of the compromise of debts. This appears to be
the view of the Indiana Courts, 216 but not of the Oregon
2 17
Courts.
The New Mexico statute declares that the addition of a seal
shall add nothnig to the effect of an instrument, but also pro"McLean v. Houston (1870) 49 Tenn. 37, 41, 42; Briggs v.
Lathan (1887) 36 Kan. 205; Judy v. Louderman (1891) 48 Ohio St.
562; Johnson v. Woodmen of the World (1906) 119 Mo. App. 98, 95
S.W. 951; Brown v. Irving (Mo., 1923) 269 S.W. 686; People's State
Bank v. Hunter (1924) 216 Mo. App. 334, 264 S.W. 54; Smith v. Ohio

Millers (1932) 330 Mo. 236, 49 S.W. (2d) 42; Cahn v. Miller (1937)
106 S.W. (2d) 495.
1 Kan. 285.
v. Blumenthal (1901) 27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393.
also Oien v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (1936) 198 Minn. 363, 270 N.W.
I Champagne v. McDonald (1927) 141 Wash. 617, 251 Pac.
Anderson v. Sanitary Dairy Inc. (1931) 160 Wash. 647, 295 Pac.
'Dudley

v. Reynolds (1863)

'"Williams

See
115.
874;
925;

Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1937) 189
Wash. 590, 66 P.(2d) 827.

'First National Bank v. Mayr (1920) 189 Ind. 299, 127 N.E. 7.
But see Kay v. Spencer (1923) 29 Wyo. 382, 213 Pac. 571.
"7Note (1939) 18 Oregon L. Rev. 147.
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vides that an instrument formerly required to have a seal shall
have the same force and effect as if it were sealed. It may be
possible to give effect under this section to an unsealed release.
The Mississippi statute begins by stating that all differences
between sealed and unsealed instruments are abolished; but it
also declares that an instrument shall be operative according to
the intent of the maker as expressed in the writing, in the same
manner as if a seal were affixed. There is little doubt that an
unsealed release would be effective under this statute, but the
question is not important, because the Mississippi courts have
themselves repudiated the rule in Pinnel's Case. The question
of the meaning of the statute will arise where the release is
wholly gratuitous, that is to say, where there is not even a part
payment.
(6) The Uniform Written Obligations Act, adopted by
Pennsylvania in 1927, and Utah in 1929, settles the matter quite
unambiguously
"A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the
person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable
for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional
express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends
to be legally bound."
From the above summary it can be seen that the language
of the statutes modifying or abrogating the common law effect
of a seal gives no strong indication that an unsealed release is
to be binding. In a few statutes an intention that this should
be the law is discernible without great strain on the imagination, but in most the intention appears to be quite the contrary.
The courts have shown little inclination to use the statutes for
preserving the effect of sealed releases at common law. On the
whole, they treat the statutes as conferring power on them to
inquire into the consideration of all contracts.
ABROGATION
The rule in Pinnel's Case has been repudiated by the courts
or abolished by statute in a number of American and British
Commonwealth jurisdictions.
JUDICIAL REPUDIATION
(1) Connecticut
In Connecticut the binding force of a receipt, even though
not under seal, was recognized at an early date. As was said in
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one case, receipts in this state have been treated to some extent
as if they were specialties. 218 Although this doctrine has been
applied to receipts for the whole debt where only part was
paid, 219 it seems that the receipt may be contradicted in order
to prove that a full discharge was not intended. 22 0 Where no
receipt in full is given, the common law rule on the effect of
2 21
part payment applies.
(2) Mississippi
In the case of Clayton v. Clark, decided in 1896,222 the
Mississippi Supreme Court overruled earlier decisions of that
state, and rejected the rule in Pinnel's Case. It doubted whether
the rule had ever applied to anything but bonds, which were
considered immediate gifts of the money for which the bonds
were conditioned. This is not true, since there are other cases
before Pinnel's Case not involving bonds. In a case of 1495 in
which Brian and Fineux expressed different views on the rule,
debt had been brought for the arrearages of rent under a lease
for years. 223 The Mississippi Court reverted to the view of the
seventeenth century English decisions in which it was said that
the creditor receives consideration in that he gets the money
without the expense or the vexation of litigation. This theory
is a product of the influence of debt on assumpsit. Although
there may be advantage to the creditor in this, there is certainly
no detriment to the debtor.
Whatever may be said in criticism of the reasoning in
Clayton v. Clark, it is now clearly the law of Mississippi that a
payment of part of a debt may be accepted in satisfaction of
the whole debt.22 4 Moreover, if part is tendered on condition
that it be in full satisfaction, and is accepted, the creditor cannot
recover the balance. 2 25 A written agreement to receive part in
mTucker v. Baldwin (1839) 13 Conn. 136.
"'

Gates v. Steele (1890) 58 Conn. 316, 20 Atl. 474; Johnson v.

Clarke (1912) 85 Conn. 679, 84 Atl. 97.
'Aborn v. Rathbone (1887) 54 Conn. 444, 8 Atl. 677.
Warren v. Skinner (1850) 20 Conn. 559; Argall v. Cook (1875)
43 Conn. 160; Bull v. Bull (1876) 43 Conn. 455; Mitchell v. Wheaton
(1878) 46 Conn. 315.

' 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565.
" Y.B. 10 H.VII.4.4
"'May Bros. v. Doggett (1929) 155 Miss. 849, 124 So. 476;
Jones v. McFarland (1937) 178 Miss. 282, 173 So. 296.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Perrin (Miss., 1938) 183 So. 917.
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full satisfaction is a contract, so that it cannot be contradicted
228
by parol evidence.
(3) New Hampshire
The rule in Pinnel's Case was followed in New Hampshire
until 1907, although it was said that a written receipt in full
on payment of part might be evidence that the balance had in
fact been paid. 227 In that year the rule was repudiated in Frye
v. Hubbell,228 in a judgment in which Parsons, C. J., delivered
a most learned and comprehensive attack on the doctrine. His
objections, not all of which were well founded, were these:
(a) The pioneer research of Ames,' " shows that as a doctrine of consideration the rule is historically unsound.
(b) It is based on the untenable assumption that money has a fixed
value.
(c) It has in effect been overruled by those cases in which it is held
that the debtor's own note for a less sum may constitute a
consideration for the creditor's promise of a full discharge. The
note may be negotiable, but no promise of money can be more
valuable than cash in hand.
"Scholastic or any other variety of logic which establishes
the sign to be more valuable than thb thing signified, the
shadow superior to the substance, the possession of an order
for money more beneficial than the cash that can be obtained
upon it, is the logic of unreason.
"When it is held that something whose only purpose and
value lies in its capacity to secure the payment of money is
a sufficient consideration for an oral discharge, the rule of
Pinnel's Case that the money itself is not such a discharge,
is logically overturned. The two cannot stand together."'
(d) The law does not measure the adequacy of consideration. The
reply to this objection is that Pinnel's Case rests, not on the
inadequacy of consideration, but on the absence of consideration.
(e) If A may sell B's note for $100 to C for $50, why should he be
unable to sell the debt to B for the same sum? The reply to
this is that the assignment of a debt is not the same transaction
as a discharge-of the debt. The consideration moving from C is
the payment of a sum of money he was not previously bound to
pay. This is not true where B pays part of his own debt.
(f) There are cases in which part payment against the background
of the debtor's insolvency constitutes consideration. These
cases, however, are of doubtful correctness. The English
doctrine is that the consideration must be collateral to the
advantage derived from the payment of part of the money.
'State Highway Dept. v. Duckworth (1937) 178 Miss. 35, 172
So. 148.
'Blanchard v. Noyes (1826) 3 N.H. 518; Page v. Brewsters
(1874) 54 N.H. 184; Watson v. Elliott (1876) 57 N.H. 511.

74 N.H. 358, 68 Atl. 325.

Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 515, 13
Harv.L.Rev. 29.
m P. 470.
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(g) The strangest of all reasons is that payment of even part of a

debt is a detriment to the debtor. The law does not as a rule
compel him to pay money. At most, the debtor is compelled to
suffer his property to be taken in execution. The law does not
prevent the debtor from breaking his contract and paying
damages. It is not necessary at this day to discuss the Holmesian
Fallacy.

(4) Minnesota
In 1938 Minnesota joined the small band of states which
have legislated Pinnel's Case out of existence by judicial action.
In Rye v. Phillips,231 K. had owned a note on which the
plaintiff was suing. The plaintiff had approached K. and the
defendant, the maker, and offered to purchase the note, turning
over'to K. a car which the plaintiff owned. The defendant at
the same time agreed to give to the plaintiff livestock worth
$250, or some livestock and cash to bring the total up to $250,
and also to pay for a license for the plaintiff's car, in satisfaction of the note. The defendant performed his part, and in the
action on the note, relied on this performance. The plaintiff
replied that the note was for a larger sum than $250 and the
amount of the license; and that there was, therefore, no consideration for his promise to accept the defendant's performance in satisfaction.
The Court recognized that it could, if it wished, find consideration on well settled principles. The defendant's promise
of payment for the license was the assumption of an obligation
by which he was not formerly bound. It preferred, however,
not to base its decision on this ground, but on a full and complete rejection of the rule in PinnePs Case.
"The doctrine thus invoked is one of the relics of antique law
which should have been discarded long ago. It is evidence of the
former capacity of lawyers and judges to make-the requirement of

consideration an overworked shibboleth rather than a logical and
just standard of actionability."'

Statutory abrogation
In twenty common law jurisdictions the rule in Pinnel's

Case has been abrogated by statute.
203 Minn. 567, 282 N.W. 459.

"'P. 569.

The jurisdictions are
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Maine, 23 3 Alabama,2 3 4 Tennessee, 2 35 South Dakota,236 North
Dakota,2 3 7 Montana,2 38 California, 23 9 Virginia,2 40 North Carolina, 24 ' Georgia,242 , and New York in the United States; Alberta, 243 Ontario,2 44 British Columbia, 245 Manitoba,2 46 and
British India 247 in the British Commonwealth. In many of
these jurisdictions written evidence of the promise to accept
part in satisfaction of the whole is required. This is obviously a
wise precaution in view of the nature of the transaction.
In its Sixth Interim Report the English Law Revision Committee recommended that an agreement to accept a lesser sum
in discharge of a larger shall be deemed to have been made for
valuable consideration, but that if the new agreement is not
performed, the original obligation shall revive. Unfortunately,
there is little likelihood that this recommendation will be translated into law. It was part of wider proposals for the reformor, more properly, the abolition-of the whole doctrine of consideration. In some quarters the sweeping character of the
proposed reform was thought objectionable. A more valid criticism is the fact that the Committee has not appreciated the full
significance of its own proposals or their impact on the law as a
whole, and has not made adequate provision for the problems
248 which would necessarily arise.

'Knowlton v. Black (1907) 102 Me. 503, 67 Atl. 563; Pomeroy
v. Prescott (1910) 106 Me. 401, 76 Atl. 898; Fuller v. Smith (1910)
107 Me. 161, 77 Atl. 706.
"'May v. Robinson (1931) 223 Ala. 442, 136 So. 734.
'Tippett v. Shaw (1926) 4 Tenn. App. 132.
Ellens v. Lind (1937) 65 S.D. 620, 277 N.W. 40.
" 7 Strobeck v. Blackmore (1917) 38 N.D. 593, 165 N.W. 980.
Sawyers v. Somers Lumber Co. (1929) 86 Mont. 169, 282 Pac.
852.
=Dobinson v. McDonald (1891) 92 Cal. 33, 27 Pac. 1098.
County of Campbell v. Howard (1922) 133 Va. 19, 112 S.E. 876.
5
Wittkowsky v. Baruch (1900) 127 N.C. 313, 37 S.E. 449.
'Whatley v. Troutman (1939) 60 Ga. App. 23, 2 S.E. (2d) 731.
" Goodchild v. Bethel (1914) 7 W.W.R. 832.
'Bank of Commerce v. Jenkins (1888) 16 Ont. L.R. 215.
' But see Bell v. Quagliotti (1918) 2 W.W.R. 915.
'"A. R. Williams Co. v. Winnipeg Storage Ltd. (1926) 4 Dom.
L.R. 1167.
'Naoroji v. Kazi Sidick (1896) 20 Bombay 636.
'Modern Law Review (1937) i, 97.
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